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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from the Eighth District Courtf s denial of
Appellant's Motion for New Trial pursuant to 59(a)(7) U.R.C.P. on
or about September

17, 1996

(R. 252-253) in reference

District Court's prior August 7, 1996, denial
Appellant's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

as

to the

(R. 198-200) of
to

the

Issue

of

Liability and granting Defendant!s Motion for Summary Judgment on
the issue of Liability as to the issues raised by Appellant's
claims based upon § 63-30a-2, U.C.A, as amended.
were dismissed

pursuant

All other claims

to stipulation and Order of

entered October 11, 1996.

(R. 256-257)

Dismissal

Notice of Appeal was

timely filed on or about October 11, 1996.

(R. 258-259).

The Supreme Court had original jurisdiction of this appeal
under § 78-2-2(3)(j ) / U.C.A., as amended.

On or about December 9,

1996, the Supreme Court poured this appeal over to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Rule 42 Utah R. App. P.

The Court of Appeals

has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2) (j ), U.C.A., as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The question presented by this appeal is whether an officer or
employee of a public entity, charged with criminal offenses in
connection with or arising out of acts or omissions of that officer
or employee during the performance of his duties, may

recover

attorney's fees from the public entity pursuant to § 63-30a-2,
U.C.A.,

as amended, which

are incurred

in defense of

charges

dismissed on motion of the defense or upon which the individual is
1

acquitted, notwithstanding that the officer/employee may plead or
be found guilty on remaining counts of a multi-count Information.
("Ruling", R. 198-200;
B.

"Ruling", R. 252-253)

APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW

Lower court judgments rendered as a matter of law are subject
to appellate review for correctness without giving deference to the
lower court's conclusion.

Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,

920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996).
Statutory interpretation is question of law which the Court of
Appeals reviews for correctness, granting no deference to the trial
court's determinations. Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P. 2d
1294, 1296 (Utah App. 1996).
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statute central to this appeal is § 63-30a-2, U.C.A., as
amended, entitled "Indictment or information against officer or
employee

-

Reimbursement

of

attorneys1

fees

and

court

costs

incurred in defense", and states in its entirety as follows:
If a state grand jury indicts or if an information is
filed against an officer or employee, in connection with
or arising out of any act or omission of that officer or
employee during the performance of his duties, within the
scope of his employment or under color of his authority,
and that indictment or information is quashed or
dismissed or results in a judgment of acquittal, unless
the indictment or information is quashed or dismissed

upon application

or motion of the prosecuting

attorney,

that officer or employee shall be entitled to recover
from the public entity reasonable attorneys' fees and
court costs necessarily incurred in the defense of that
indictment or information.
Other rules $md statutes which may be of central importance to
determination of this appeal are the following.
2

Rule 4 of the Utah Rules

of Criminal

its entirety in the addendum hereto.

Procedure

is set forth in

It states in pertinent part,

(b) " . • . .an indictment or information shall charge the
offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted

..."

(d) ". . . after verdict, an indictment or information may be
amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to
bar subsequent prosecution . . ."
(e) "

when facts not set out in an information or

indictment are required to inform a defendant of the nature and
cause of the offense charged.
The

term

"Information"

..."
pursuant

to

§

77-1-3,

U.C.A.,

as

amended, is defined as follows:
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing
charging a person with a public defense which is
presented, signed and filed in the office of the clerk
where the prosecution is commenced pursuant to § 77-21.1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Loni DeLand, obtained

an assignment of Sheriff

Lloyd Meacham's claim for attorney's fees against Uintah County
pursuant to § 63-30a-2, U.C.A., as amended, in relation to the
defense of criminal charges lodged against Sheriff Meacham arising
out of acts or omissions during the performance of his duties,
within the scope of his employment or under color of his authority.
(R. 89;

R. 63)

On or about March
against

Uintah

County

6,
(R.

1996, Mr. DeLand
1-8)

for

brought

reimbursement

an action
of

those

attorney's fees based upon the assignment, as specifically set
3

forth in the Second Cause of Action of his Amended Complaint-

(R.

19-24)
Mr, DeLand submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment as to the
Issues of Liability and Damages as to Plaintiff's Second Cause of
action on or about June 21, 1996.

(R. 44-133).

Uintah County

responded on or about July 29, 1996 with a counter-motion entitled
Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability.

(R. 137-

197).
The

trial

court

made

and

entered

its

"Ruling"

denying

Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgement on the Issue of Liability
and Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue
of Liability, both in respect to the second cause of action of
Appellant's First Amended Complaint on August 7, 1996.
200)

(R. 198-

A copy of the trial court's "Ruling" of August 7, 1996,

granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is appended hereto
as "Exhibit A".

Mr. DeLand

timely

filed

a Motion

for

"New

Trial" Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) U.R.C.P. on or about August 15,
1996, (R. 235-244), to which the County responded (R. 247-251) on
or about September 13, 1996.

The Trial Court issued its "Ruling"

denying Appellant's motion for new trial on or about September 17,
1996 reaffirming its August 7th "Ruling".
of

the

trial

court's

"Ruling"

of

(R. 252-253).

September

17,

1996

A copy
denying

Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial is appended hereto as "Exhibit B".
The

parties

stipulated

to

dismissal

of

the

Appellant's

remaining claims for relief (R. 254-255) and pursuant thereto the
Trial Court's Order of Dismissal of Plaintiff's First and Third
4

Causes of Action Without Prejudice was made and entered on or about
October

11, 1996, thus disposing

issues.

of all remaining

claims

and

(R. 256-257)

Thereafter, from the trial court's "Ruling" of September 17,
1996 the Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on or about October
11, 1996.

(R. 258-259).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

As

to

liability

the

of

sole

Uintah
are

issue

presented

County

pursuant

no

material

herein
to

factual

with

respect

to

63-30a-2, U.C.A.,

as

amended,

there

disputes

between

the

parties.

As reflected in the Trial Court's August 7, 1996, Ruling

(R. 198-200) granting Uintah County's Motion for Summary Judgment
on the Issue of Liability,
"The essential facts necessary to decide this case are
not in dispute. Those facts are set forth in separate
paragraph numbers in Plaintiff's Memorandum and will not
be reincorporated in this Ruling.
It should be noted
that the parties have essentially agreed as to those
facts except for the reasonableness or the amount of the
fees and the fact the representatives of Uintah County
had previously acknowledged that compensation would be
appropriate." (R. 200)
Those material undisputed facts before the trial court are set
forth as follows.
Lloyd D. Meacham was the Uintah County Sheriff in October of
1993.

(R.

91)

On or

about

October

10, 1993, a

six

count

Information was filed in the Eighth District Court by the office of
the Attorney General for the State of Utah, Criminal no. 931800490
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the criminal case") alleging
three

third

degree

felony

counts
5

of

misuse

of

public

money,

specifically

that

the

defendant,

Lloyd

D.

Meacham,

"...while

sheriff of Uintah County, a public officer, knowingly made a profit
out of public monies
authorized

and/or used

the same

for

a purpose

by law, " in violation of § 76-8-404, and

Article 13, Section 8, of the Utah State Constitution;
class

B misdemeanor

government

counts

documents.

of

(R.

falsification

91;

or

not

202, and
and three

alteration

Information,

Criminal

of
no.

931800490, R. 75-78)
Shortly thereafter Appellant, Loni DeLand, a member in good
standing of the Utah State Bar and experienced criminal defense
lawyer,

undertook

respect

to

the

the

representation

charges

contained

in

of

Sheriff

the

Meacham

Information

for

with
the

specified retainer amount of $7,500.00, against which Mr. DeLand
agreed he would charge his normal and usual fees and costs and bill
Mr. Meacham for the remainder over and above that amount.

Mr.

Meacham never paid the retainer although he was billed for all
services rendered.
In

his

(R. 91-93)

representation

of

Sheriff

Meacham,

among

various

defense functions, Mr. DeLand undertook

to conduct interviews;

review transcripts of meetings; travel

from Salt Lake City to

Vernal several times; represent Sheriff Meacham at a preliminary
hearing on or about February 10, 1994, from which Sheriff Meacham
was bound
Criminal

over to stand
no.

representatives

931800490,
of

anticipated trial;

trial

in the District

R.

79-85,

the Attorney

at

General's

Court

82);
office;

(Docket,

confer
prepare

with
for

prepare a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in
6

Support of a Motion to Dismiss;

argue the Motion to Dismiss before

the District Court; et

(R. 89-90)

As counsel

cetera.

for Sheriff Meacham, Mr. DeLand moved

for the

District Court to dismiss the three felony counts as a matter of
law based upon the established facts as preserved in the transcript
of preliminary hearing.

The motion was fully briefed and argued on

or about April 11, 1994 by Mr. DeLand, and was likewise fully
briefed and argued by Assistant Attorneys General, Michael D. Wimms
and Creighton Horton for the prosecution.
As

(R.89-90)

a consequence of Mr. DeLandTs Motion

District Court dismissed the felony charges.

to Dismiss, the
The dismissal was

granted upon the sole motion of the defense, over the objection and
without the stipulation, approval, agreement or acquiescence of the
prosecution.

(R. 89-90;

Docket, Criminal no. 931800490, Minute

Entry of April 11, 1994, R. 79-85 at 81)
Subsequent to dismissal of the felony charges against Sheriff
Meacham, a plea bargain was struck whereby Mr. Meacham agreed,
inter

alia,

misdemeanors.

to

plead

guilty

to

the

three

charged

class

B

The State agreed not to file an amended information

seeking additional charges against Mr. Meacham.

(R. 89; Affidavit

of Defendant Lloyd Meacham in Advance of Guilty Plea and Agreement,
Criminal no. 931800490, R. 68-74)
As Sheriff Meacham's counsel Mr. DeLand determined from the
outset of his representation that the three misdemeanor charges
were essentially well-founded and indefensible.
overriding

importance were the felony charges.
7

The matters of
Therefore Mr.

DeLand concentrated virtually all of his efforts toward defense of
the felony charges.

Mr. DeLand attributes only a few hours of his

over-all representation to defense of the misdemeanor charges.

(R.

87)
Mr. DeLand billed Sheriff Meacham in accordance with their
prior fee agreement.
approximately

(R. 87,88)

The total amount of the claim is

$36,000, exclusive of any amount which might

be

attributable to defense of the misdemeanor matters. (R. 87-88) The
District Court by its adverse rulings on the issue of the County's
liability, (R. 198-200; 252-253), however, precluded inquiry into
whether the attorney's fees incurred by Mr. Meacham in defense of
the felony charges were fair, reasonable and necessarily incurred.
Those issues are therefore not before this Court.
In or about May of

1994 subsequent

to conclusion

of the

criminal case, Sheriff Meacham assigned to Mr. DeLand all right,
title

and

interest

to recover

all attorney's

fees,

costs

and

expenses which he incurred and might be entitled to recover against
Uintah County.

The original written assignment was lost, misplaced

or destroyed, however it was replaced.

(R. 89;

Assignment of

Claims, R. 63)
Pursuant
Meacham's

to

claim

that
to

assignment

Uintah

County

Mr. DeLand
on

or

submitted

about

July

Sheriff
7,

1994

requesting reimbursement of the attorney's fees and costs in regard
to defense of the criminal case.
subsequently

(R. 88;

59-61)

Mr. DeLand

held numerous discussions with representatives

of

Uintah County, however no compensation was ever agreed to or paid.
8

(R. 88)
Accordingly on March 6, 1996, Mr. DeLand brought an action
against Uintah County.
of

Mr.

Meacham's

(R. 1-8)

claim

for

His claim, based upon assignment

reimbursement

of

attorney's

fees

pursuant to statute, is specifically set forth in the Second Cause
of Action of his Amended Complaint.

(R. 19-24)

Mr. DeLand submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment as to the
Issues of Liability and Damages as to Plaintiff's Second Cause of
action on or about June 21, 1996.

(R. 44-133).

Uintah County

responded on or about July 29, 1996 with a counter-motion entitled
Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability.

(R. 137-

197).
The

trial court entered

its memorandum

"Ruling"

denying

Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgement on the Issue of Liability
and Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue
of Liability, both in respect to the second cause of action of
Appellant's First Amended Complaint on August 7, 1996.
200;

(R. 198-

Addendum, Exhibit A)
The District Court's decision adopted Uintah County's position

that all six counts of the Information must have been dismissed or
result in an acquittal for Sheriff Meacham to entitled him to any
reimbursement of his defense costs.

The District Court reasoned

that inasmuch as, ". . . there was not a complete exoneration of
Sheriff Meacham in this case, this Court can not allow attorney
fees for defense which did not result in a total but only a partial
acquittal."

(R. 199)
9

Mr. DeLand timely filed a Motion for "New Trial" Pursuant to
Rule 59(a)(7) U.R.C.P. on or about August 15, 1996, (R. 235-244),
to which the County responded (R. 247-251)
13, 1996.

or about September

The Trial Court issued its memorandum "Ruling" denying

Appellant's motion for new trial on or about September 17, 1996
"Ruling11.

reaffirming its August 7th

(R. 252-253;

Addendum,

Exhibit B)
The

parties

stipulated

to

dismissal

of

the

Appellant's

remaining claims for relief (R. 254-255) and pursuant thereto the
Trial Court's Order of Dismissal of Plaintiff's First and Third
Causes of Action Without Prejudice was made and entered on or about
October

11, 1996, thus disposing of all

issues.

(R. 256-257;

remaining

addendum, Exhibit C)

claims and

Thereafter, from the

trial court's "Ruling" of September 17, 1996 the Appellant filed
his Notice of Appeal on or about October 11, 1996.

(R. 258-259).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This

is

a

case

of

statutory

construction.

Appellant's

argument is that a claimant under § 63~30a-2, U.C.A., as amended,
is entitled to recoup his attorney's fees for those Counts of a
multi-count Information which were dismissed upon his motion or
upon which he has otherwise prevailed upon the merits, irrespective
of the fact that on other counts he may have been found or entered
a

plea

of

guilty.

The

statute

does

not

require

"complete

exoneration" and it is a misconstruction of the statute to require
that the "whole" information be dismissed before any recovery of
attorney's fees may be had.
10

ARGUMENT
The District Court's Ruling that in a multi-count
information, the entire information must be dismissed in
order to qualify a defendant for reimbursement of his
attorney's fees under § 63-30a-2, U.C.A., is in error.
The statute in question refers such terms as "indictment" and
"information", to the terms "act" or "omission", in the singular:
If a state grand jury indicts or if an information is
filed against an officer or employee, in connection with
or arising out of any act or omission of that officer or
employee during the performance of his duties, within the
scope of his employment or under color of his authority,
and that indictment or information is quashed or
dismissed or results in a judgment of acquittal, unless
the indictment or information is quashed or dismissed
upon application or motion of the prosecuting attorney,
that officer or employee shall be entitled to recover
from the public entity reasonable attorneys1 fees and
court costs necessarily incurred in the defense of that
indictment or information. (emphasis added)
Section 63-30a-2, U.C.A., as amended.
The

plain

language

of

the

statute

indicates

that

"an

information" is used in reference to a singular event, "any act or
omission".

The statute does not address multi-count informations.

Appellant's position is that a public employee should be entitled
to recover for the defense costs of individual counts dismissed
from a multi-count information.

Such a reading is consistent both

internally within itself and with various other provisions of the
Utah Code and Rules of Criminal

Procedure which

speak

to the

meaning of the term "information".
The District Court held that because there was not "a complete
exoneration of Sheriff Meacham in this case, this Court can not
allow attorney fees for defense which did not result in a total but
only a partial

acquittal."

(R. 199)
11

The District

Court's

reasoning is set forth as follows:
This Court is of the opinion that the statute should be
construed narrowly and that its legislative purpose and
intent would be to fully compensate a person who held
public office from having to defend criminal charges
brought as a result of his holding that office where the
charges were found to be unfounded and either dismissed
or where the defendant obtained a full acquittal. (R.
199)
The District Court's finding of such legislative purpose and
intent requiring "full acquittal" is not apparent from reading the
plain language of the statute.

A more practical yet nonetheless

literal reading dictates a contrary conclusion.
In interpreting a legislative enactment it is fundamental that
the court looks first to the plain language of the statute.

If

there is no reason to go beyond the plain language, rescrt to
extrinsic factors is unnecessary:
(0)ur primary objective is to give effect to the
legislature's intent.
Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561,
562-63 (Utah 1996) (citing West Jordan v, Morrison, 656
P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982)).
We generally look first to
the plain language of the statute to discern the
legislative intent. Id. " 'Thus, we will interpret a
statute according to its plain language, unless such a
reading is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in
blatant contravention of the express purpose of the
statute.' " Id. (quoting Perrine v. Kennecott Mining
Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996). "'Only when we
find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we
seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant
policy considerations.' "
Id. (quoting World Peace
Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253,
259 (Utah 1994)).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183,
1186 (Utah 1996).
"A statute is ambiguous if it can be understood by reasonably
well-informed persons to have different meanings."

Patterson v.

Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah App. 1995).
12

Appellant is not urging this court to find that the statute is
ambiguous.

The plain language and a common sense reading dictate

an interpretation that, since different charges can and perhaps
sometimes

must

be

brought

in one

information

(e.g.

Rule

9.5

U.R.Cr.P.), and the statute speaks in terms of "an information" for
an

"act"

contains

or
more

information.

"omission", in effect
than

one

a multi-count

information,

each

count

information
a

separate

However, even if is deemed to be ambiguous, extrinsic

evidence such as other statutes and rules, common usage, policy
considerations, and the limited evidence of legislative

intent

establish that the District Court's narrow interpretation is not
warranted.
Assuming arguendo that an ambiguity exists, the limited amount
of legislative history which was before the District Court (R. 154156;

R. 94-101), the discussion on the floor of the Senate, seems

to lend at least as much if not greater credence to the Appellant's
position.

The following is excerpted of

Senator Haven Barlow's

statement on the Senate Floor, March 7, 1977:
Mr. president, Senate Bill 247 relates to the providing
for the reimbursement to officers and employees for legal
fees and costs incurred in the special defense of a grand
jury indictment. Of course, what this means is if they
are found innocent and in defending themselves against
charges which were not proven, it would simply reimburse
them for reasonable attorney fees, for these charges, or
for the indictment. . . . (emphasis added)
Transcript of debate, March 7, 1977, Senate Bill 247.
The broader view is supported by the language of other rules
and statutes.

For example, Rule 4 U.R.Cr.P. states in subsection

(b) that "an indictment or information shall charge the offense for
13

which the defendant is being prosecuted . . . "
and

states

in

subsection

(d) that

".

.

(emphasis added),

. after

verdict,

an

indictment or information may be amended so as to state the offense
with such particularity as to bar subsequent prosecution . . ."
(emphasis added), and further states in subsection (e) "when facts
not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform
a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged. . . . "
(emphasis added).
The underlying implication of these portions of Rule 4 is that
"an

information"

offense".

states

a

single

free-standing

offense,

"an

There is no need to further define what effect an

information with multiple counts may have on Rule 4.

The reason

for this is obvious, i.e., each count is treated as a separate
information for all intents and purposes within the Rule.
An information is specifically defined as follows:
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing
charging a person with a public offense which is
presented, signed and filed in the office of the clerk
where the prosecution is commenced pursuant to § 77-21.1.
(emphasis added)
Section 77-1-3, U.C.A., as
amended.
The very essence of this definition is that an information charges
a separate, independent and single public offense.
By logical extension an information charging more than one
public offense is in effect more than one Information.

So in a

literal sense what Sheriff Meacham obtained through the efforts of
his legal counsel in the criminal case was the dismissal of three
felony informations.

Joining more than one separate offense in a

single information does not alter the separate and distinct nature
14

and quality of each separate offense so charged.

There is no

melding together of separate crimes just because they are charged
jointly in one document.
separate

charges

set

There is no synergistic effect among

forth

as multiple

offenses

in

a

single

physical document, which such document has come by common usage to
be termed an "information."
On the contrary, each count or charge of an indictment or
information is to be considered separately; the State must prove
each element of each charged crime by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Each separate alleged offense must stand and be considered

on its own.

In jury trials involving multi-count informations,

there is a stock jury instruction which is uniformly given to that
effect.

This Court has approved such an instruction:

A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of
the Information. Each charge and the evidence pertaining
to it should be considered separately. The fact that you
may find the accused guilty or not guilty as to one of
the offenses charged should not control your verdict as
to any other offense charged.
Footnote 5, State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 46 (Utah App.
1990)
There

is no

reason

to

treat

separately

charged

offenses

any

differently for the purpose of reimbursement pursuant to § 63-30a2.
Uintah County argued in the District Court that if a public
employee were charged with 20 criminal counts, 19 resulting in
convictions, while one resulted in an acquittal, it would not be
proper

to

afford

the

public

employee

reimbursement

attorneyTs fees for the count which was dismissed.
15

for

his

This conclusion

merely begs the question.

If the particular count dismissed were

one wherein the cost of defense could be segregated and determined
with reasonable accuracy there is simply no logical reason why such
fees should not be reimbursed.
The offense which was dismissed might be the only felony in a
20 count indictment involving unrelated misdemeanors. For example,
a

defendant

might

be

charged

with

alteration

of

a

proposed

legislative bill or resolution, a third degree felony pursuant to
§ 76-8-107, and 19 separate class B misdemeanor counts of receiving
bribes pursuant to § 76-8-106.

Or the Felony Count might be one

arising from an act or omission in the course of employment for
which defense costs would be reimbursable pursuant to

§ 63-30a-2,

but the misdemeanor counts wholly unrelated to the course and scope
of public employment.

In either case, while the misdemeanor counts

may be readily proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the felony matter
might be one of which the public employee is innocent, the charge
defensible cind by virtue of defense counsel's efforts a dismissal
or acquittal results.

In such a scenario the overwhelming bulk of

the defense effort might be put to the defense of but one out of
twenty counts.

There is simply no logical reason why § 63-30a-2,

U.C.A., would not afford a remedy for reimbursement of attorney's
fees for that portion of the defense which was allocated to the
felony.

Of course, the situation could be reversed and the matter

which was dismissed might not be worthy of but a small amount of
reimbursement.
The District Court's avowed "narrow" construction overlooks
16

the fact that there is no qualitative distinction between
acquittal

or

dismissal

of

one

count

encompassing

"an

act

the
or

omission" among many alleged offenses in a multi-count information,
and that of a one count information.

There are many possible

permutations which illustrate the kind of confusion the District
Court's ruling engenders.

Picture for example two situations, in

each of which a public employee is charged with three felonies,
each of which would be reimbursable under § 63-30a-2, and three
misdemeanors, none of which would.

In the first case suppose the

defendant is acquitted of all six counts.

Given the District

Court's "narrow" construction the public employee defendant would
be entitled to recover all defense costs.

In the second instance

the defendant is acquitted of the felonies but convicted of the
misdemeanors.
employee

By

could

misdemeanor

the

not

District

recover

convictions

had

Court's

defense
no

reasoning

costs

relationship

the

even

public

though

whatsoever

to

the
the

defendantf s public employment.
Such a perverse result could not have been intended by the
legislature in enacting § 63-30a-2, U.C.A.

The District Court's

narrow construction renders the statute "unreasonably confused,
inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of
the statute."

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, supra, 920

P.2d 1183, 1186.
The

problem

construction.

is
There

in
is

reality
a

definition of information as

not

semantic

a

matter

difference

"an accusation
17

...

of

statutory

between

the

(of) a public

offense . . . "

§ 77-1-3, U.C.A., supra,

and the physical document

which is universally referred to as an "information" regardless of
the number of counts which may be joined.
definition;

the latter custom and usage.

The former is precise
Section 63-30a-2 itself

however does nothing to prevent the courts from recognizing that
distinction for what it is, were semantics, and allocating the
appropriate amount of attorney's fees to compensate the public
employee who has been vindicated on one or more counts.

The

problem is only a practical one of determining and segregating the
attorney's fees for the count(s) dismissed. There is no need to
throw out the entire statutory right of reimbursement because of
some perceived difficulty in proof.
Even in civil practice, where multiple causes of action are
the norm, the rules discuss the charging document as "a pleading
which sets forth a claim for relief" (emphasis added) and state
that such pleading shall contain "a short and plain statement of
the claim . . ." (emphasis added). Rule 8(a) U.R.C.P.
each

civil

"complaint".

cause

of

action

might

be

considered

So likewise,
a

separate

In federal civil rights matters for instance it is

common practice for court's to segregate out attorney's fees with
respect to matters upon which a plaintiff has prevailed from those
the plaintiff has lost, and award a reasonable attorney's fee for
success on those winning issues in litigation notwithstanding the
failure of other claims made.

See, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424 (1983); Tidewell v. Ft. Howard Corp,, 898 F.2d 406, 412 (10th
Cir. 1993).

The key in such cases is to achieve success on the
18

merits

of

a

significant

issue

in

the

litigation.

Once

the

plaintiff has done this, he "has crossed the threshold to a fee
award of some kind."

Texas State Teacher's Assoc, v. Garland

Independent School Dist., 498 U.S. 782, 791-92 (1989).
By analogy to this case it is clear that Sheriff Meacham
crossed the threshold to a fee award by having three significant
successes on the merits of three significant issues, specifically
three

felony

dismissed.

charges

("Informations",

the

it were) which

were

He is not entitled to and no compensation is requested

for defense of the misdemeanors.
of

as

felonies, however,

The substantial cost of defense

should

be

compensated.

It

is

an

unnecessary, inequitable and unjust reading of the statute not to
do so.
The District Court states in its Ruling (R. 199), that "when
Judge Hyde dismissed the felony charges, it was a result of his
interpretation of the exact felony that was charged," apparently
attaching

some special

significance

to the particulars

of the

reasoning by which Judge Hyde arrived at his decision to dismiss
the felony charges against sheriff Meacham.

Under the type of

circumstances presented here, where the court in the criminal case
entertains a motion to dismiss based upon an undisputed set of
facts, the determination to dismiss is always as a consequence of
the judge's "interpretation" of the exact felony that was charged.
As a result of Judge Hyde's interpretation and application of the
specific facts of the case to the law, he determined that those
facts did not constitute the public offense charged.
19

As to those felony counts which Judge Hyde dismissed, the
dismissals amounted to complete exoneration and vindication of the
accused.

There can be no other conclusion drawn.

The District Court's assertion that the legislative intent was
to fully compensate a person who held public office where charges
were found to be unfounded (R. 199) is correct.
just

that:

unfounded;

the

felony

charges

against

they were therefore dismissed.

Judge Hyde found

Sheriff

Meacham

were

Judge Hyde ? s ruling

meant that reasonable jurors could not differ in their belief that
Sheriff Meacham was not guilty of the felony offenses charged.

It

was a dismissal on motion of the defense which fully satisfied the
reimbursement statute.

Sheriff Meacham could not have been any

more vindicated or exonerated than he was by these dismissals.
The District Court's Ruling (R. 198-200) fosters an ad

hoc

determination in every case a charge is dismissed in a multi-count
information as to whether the facts were "close" to the charges
dismissed.

In assessing the issue of reimbursement of attorney's

fees, this would require the court to decide whether the "facts"
which gave rise to the dismissed criminal charges were bad or good
ones.

If the facts are "bad", then the perpetrator shouldn't get

attorney's fees, even though the case was dismissed on the merits.
This procedure is not provided by § 63-30A-2.

Once the charges

have been dismissed the reason for the dismissal has no bearing on
the right to reimbursement of fees.
If the question is perceived to revolve around whether the
facts are "close" to the dismissed charges, the merger doctrine
20

notwithstanding, Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Ut.2d 397, 402 P. 2d 696, 697
(1965); Adams v. Davies, 107 Ut. 597, 156 P.2d 207, 209 (1945),
then

reimbursement

would

occur

under

only

the most

egregious

circumstances, e.g., where criminal charges are filed with reckless
disregard as to the merit or truthfulness of the allegations.

In

most criminal prosecutions, at least where identity is not at
issue, the "facts" will often be "close" to the allegations.

But

"close" is, of course, anathema to finding a person guilty by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is furthermore not unknown for the "wrong" charges to be
brought under circumstances where a defendant, while not guilty of
the offense charged, might well be found guilty of something if
more appropriate charges were brought given the same facts.

That

does not mean that a vigorous defense was not reasonable and
necessary in a case where the "wrong" charges are filed, nor that
the defendant is not vindicated and exonerated of those charges
when dismissed.
in holding that in order to obtain reimbursement a multi-count
Information must always be dismissed in its entirety, the District
Court's decision encourages the prosecution to lump a charge such
as reckless driving, regardless of its substance or weight, along
with a serious charge such as first degree murder by a peace
officer in the chance hope of getting a conviction, perhaps a
compromise verdict, at least on the less serious but more easily
proven offense in order to defeat the officer's right to attorney
fees if he is acquitted of the homicide.
21

This is neither sound statutory construction, nor sensible
policy.
own.

Each count or cause of action must be considered on its

Each count must be considered a separate independent free-

standing "information".

The notion uhat in order to be entitled to

reimbursement, the employee must obtain a dismissal of all the
counts, related or unrelated, elevates form over substance to an
absurd degree, makes no logical sense, and ^n fact flies in the
face of the definitions and usages provided by existing statutes
and rules.
If the public employee prevails on some counts but not others,
the problem is a practical one, not a legal one.

The same sort of

weighing and sifting must take place as prescribed in Dixie State
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P. 2d 985 (Utah 1988).

There although the

bank's claim against Bracken was small, the court determined it was
entitled to a comparatively large fee based on a number of factors,
among them, the difficulty presented by the counterclaim imposed,
the tactics used by the defendants, etc.

Id.

at 991.

On its face

it would not seem fair to award the bank a fee greater than its
basic claim.

But, despite the ostensibly perverse result and the

difficulties of proof with regard to allocating what portion of
attorney's fees should be attributed to contract and which to tort,
etc., the Supreme Court held that the circumstances warranted such
a conclusion.

By the same token, the fact that Sheriff Meacham

entered

a

subsequent

plea

charged

with the dismissed

to misdemeanors
felonies

which

is no reason

were

jointly

to deny him

reimbursement with respect to those separate charges against which
22

he was required to devote substantial resources to defend and upon
which he was completely exonerated.
The

District

Court's

reference

to

the

public

employee

negotiating for attorney's fees at the time of the "plea bargain"
is also unsound.

(R. 198)

In addition to being inconsistent with

§ 63-30a-2, U.C.A., which provides for complete reimbursement upon
dismissal, it fails to consider the realities of the reimbursement
statute whereby the employee is directed to seek payment not from
the prosecuting authority, in this case the state attorney general,
but from " . . .

funds appropriated by the department or division

that employed the officer or employee.
U.C.A.

."

§ 63-30a-3(2)(a),

The mention of attorney's fees during plea bargaining,

particularly under the instant circumstances where the prosecutor
has absolutely no province or authority, is clearly untenable and
inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
The District Court's granting of Appellee's motion for Summary
Judgment on the issue of Liability should be reversed and this case
remanded with directions that the Appellant's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the issue of Liability be granted and for the District
Court to hold such proceedings as may be necessary to determine the
amount of reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs necessarily
incurred in the defense of the dismissed felony charges against
Sheriff

Meacham

and

to

award

such

amount

to Appellant

as

so

determined along with Appellant's reasonable attorney's fees and
costs in bringing this appeal.
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ADDENDUM 1

63-30a-l

63-30a-1.

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

Definitions.

As used in this act:
(1) "Officer or employee" means any individual who at the time of an
event giving rise to a claim under this act is or was elected or appointed to
or employed by a public entity, whether or not compensated, but does not
include an independent contractor.
(2) "Public entity" means the state or any political subdivision of it or
any office, department, division, board, agency, commission, council, authority, institution, hospital, school, college, university, or other instrumentality of the state or any such political subdivision.
History: L. 1977, ch. 245, § 1.
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this

act," as used in this section, means Laws 1977,
ch. 245, which enacted this chapter.

63-30a-2. Indictment or information against officer or employee — Reimbursement of attorneys' fees and
court costs incurred in defense.
If a state grand jury indicts or if an information is filed against an officer or
employee, in connection with or arising out of any act or omission of that
officer or employee during the performance of his duties, within the scope of
his employment or under color of his authority, and that indictment or information is quashed or dismissed or results in a judgment of acquittal, unless
the indictment or information is quashed or dismissed upon application or
motion of the prosecuting attorney, that officer or employee shall be entitled
to recover from the public entity reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs
necessarily incurred in the defense of that indictment or information.

1MMUP
PERFORMIN
Section
63-30b-l.
63-30b-2.

Definitions.
Voluntary services
from liability —

63-30b-l.

Definitio

As used in this act:
(1) "Public entity"
any office, departmei
thority, institution, \
mentality of the sta
(2) "Compensation
ever, whether per di<
for the purpose of p;
by the person perfo
History: C. 1953, G3-30b-l,
1979, ch. 93, § 1.
Meaning of "this act." —

History: L. 1977, ch. 245, § 2; 1983, ch.
131, 8 7.

63-30a-3. Payment of reimbursement of attorneys' fees
and court costs.

A.L.R. — Construction an
"Good Samaritan" statutes. 6«v

(1) A request for reimbursement of attorneys' fees and court costs shall be
filed in the manner provided in Sections 63-30-36 and 63-30-37.
(2) (a) Any reimbursement of attorneys' fees and court costs filed on behalf
of an officer or employee of the state shall be paid from funds appropriated to the department or division that employed the officer or employee
at the time of the act or omission that gave rise to the indictment or
information.
(b) If those funds are unavailable, the reimbursement shall be paid
from the General Fund upon approval by the Board of Examiners and
legislative appropriation.

63-30b-2.

History: C. 1953, 63-30a-3, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 131, § 8; 1986, ch. 194, § 16; 1987,
ch. 30, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1983,
ch. 131, § 8 repealed former § 63-30a-3, as en-

acted by Laws 1977, ch. 245, § 3, relating to
application of the 1977 act, and enacted
present § 63-30a-3.
Severability Clauses. — Section 9 of Laws
1983, ch. 131 provided: "If any provision of this
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Volunta
Exceptio

Any person performii
tion, under the general s
be immune from liabilit
in connection with the o
those services, unless i
grossly negligent, not i
History: C. 1953, 63-30b-'2
1979, ch. 93, § 2.

ADDENDUM 2

fINAL CODE

the rights of any innocent persons. Ant
ercisable by or transferable for value to the]
H to the defendant. The defendant or anyj
* on behalf of the defendant is not eligible
t any sale ordered by the court,
stay the sale or disposition of the property
peal of the criminal case giving rise to the3
nstrates that proceeding with the sale or^
^esult in irreparable injury, harm, or loss'; Jhapter
j£ Preliminary Provisions,
>r other disposition of property forfeited pa. Peace Officer Designation.
s forfeited may be used first to pay the 2a. Pleas in Abeyance.
the sale including expenses of seizure, % Security to Keep the Peace.
property pending its disposition, adver- 6. Removal by Judicial Proceedings.
7. Arrest, by Whom, and How Made.
ted under Subsections (7) through (13)
i6a. Commitment and Treatment of Mentally 111 Persons.
a (6).
18. The Judgment.
sions of this section to the contrary, the 18a. The Appeal.
en records applicable to the forfeitable 19. The Execution.
ny valid lien against the property has 20. Bail.
holder did not violate the provisions of 20a. Bail Forfeiture Procedure.
»nerty shall be subject to such lien, and :22. Subpoena Powers for Aid of Criminal Investigation and Grants of
m of the property to the lien holde
Immunity.
secured by the lien,
r or 23a. Interception of Communications.
ider Subsection
is (7) through (13), the 24. Disposal of Property Received by Peace Officer.
nay:
27. Pardons and Paroles.
nation or remission of forfeiture, for
30. Extradition.
victims of a violation of this section or
31. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
0he rights of innocent persons in the
31a. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.
ty, in its discretion, grant the petition;
32. Counsel for Indigent Defendants.
ider this section;
36. Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act.
is providing information resulting in a
37. Victims' Rights.
38. Rights of Crime Victims Act.
tecessary to safeguard and maintain
s section pending its disposition,
•vhere forfeiture is declared, in whole

TITLE 77

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE

>y the prosecuting agency prosecuting
the recipient of forfeited assets from
re proceeding including seizure and
ifi individual or individuals whose
re, and may assess costs against any
operty as appropriate,
i independent of any other proceedsection or the laws of this state.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendt, effective July 1, 1996, rewrote Subsection
(a).

CHAPTER 1
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

Section
77-1-3.

Definitions.

77-1-3.

Definitions.

For the purpose of this act:
(1) "Criminal action" means the proceedings by which a person is
charged, accused, and brought to trial for a public offense.
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation in writing presented by a grand
jury to the district court charging a person with a public offense.
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing, charging a person
with a public offense which is presented, signed, and filed in the office of
the clerk where the prosecution is commenced pursuant to Section
77-2-1.1.
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(4) "Magistrate" means a justice or judge of a court of record or not of
record or a commissioner of such a court appointed in accordance with
Section 78-3-31, except t h a t the authority of a court commissioner to act as
a magistrate shall be limited by rule of the judicial council. The judicial
council rules shall not exceed constitutional limitations upon the delegation of judicial authority.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1995 amendHistory: C. 1953, 77-1-3, enacted by L. ment, effective May 1, 1995, added the proviso
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 68, § 1; 1983, ch.
at the end of the first sentence and added the
212, § 1; 1985, ch. 174, § 2; 1985, ch. 212, second sentence in Subsection (4).
§ 16; 1990, ch. 59, § 26; 1991, ch. 268, § 16;
1992, ch. 33, § 1; 1995, ch. 201, § 2.

77-1-6. Rights of defendant.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Double jeopardy.
— Sentencing.
Modification of defendant's sentence between
the oral announcement of sentence and the
later entry of a more severe written sentence
did not violate constitutional and statutory
protections against double jeopardy. Under

State v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), a sentence is not entered until it has
been reduced to writing and signed by the court
and t h u s defendant was sentenced only once.
State v. Wright, 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995).

CHAPTER la
PEACE OFFICER DESIGNATION
Section
77-la-2.
77-la-4.

Correctional officer.
Special function officers.

77-la-l.

Section
77-la-10.

Duties to investigate specified instances of abuse or neglect.

Peace officer.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. — Application of "fireman's rule" to
preclude recovery by peace officer for injuries

77-la-2.

inflicted by defendant in resisting arrest, 25
A.L.R.5th 97.

Correctional officer.

(1) (a) "Correctional officer" means an officer or employee of the Depart*
ment of Corrections, youth corrections, any political subdivision of the
state, or any private entity which contracts with the state or its political
subdivisions to incarcerate inmates, who is charged with the primary duty'
of providing community protection.
(b) "Correctional officer" includes an individual assigned to carry out]
any of the following types of functions:
(i) controlling, transporting, supervising, and taking into custody of
persons arrested or convicted of crimes;
(ii) supervising and preventing the escape of persons in state anil
local incarceration facilities; and
(iii) guarding and managing inmates and providing security an
enforcement services at a correctional facility.
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PEACE (

(2) (a) Correctional officers hi
in the performance of their
employed by the Departmc
Chapter l o , Department of'
(b) Correctional officers n
under conditions specified by
or the chief law enforcement
(3) (a) An individual may not
until the individual has satis
for correctional officers and t
or the chief administrator
completion of training to tl
Training.
(b) The Department of Cor
shall establish and maintai
service training programs a
Standards and Training, wit
Peace Officer Standards a n d r
of no fewer than 40 hours per
own staff or other agencies.
(4) Employees of the Division <
contract with the division are not
section until July 1, 1997.
History: C. 1953, 77-la-2, e n a c t e d I
1985, c h . 174, § 3; 1993, ch. 103, § 7;
ch. 163, § 1.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1996 an

77-la-4.

Special functioi

(1) (a) "Special function office
investigations, service of lega
(b) "Special function officei
port-of-entry agents as define
or agents of the Department o
enforce the provisions of Title
school district security offic«
designated pursuant to Secti
Center security officers desig
fire arson investigators for aj
security officers of any airport
political subdivisions, railroad
under Section 17-30-2, and ;
having peace officer authority
(c) Ordinance enforcement
ties may be special function o
(2) (a) Special function officer.1
engaged in the duties of thei
general law enforcement. If tl
respecting facilities or prope
connection with acts occurri
employed or when required ft
property, or employees.
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Rule 2
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Rule 2. Time.
(a) In computing any period of time, the day of the act or event from which
the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day
of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday,
or a legal holiday. When a period of time prescribed or allowed is less than
seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall not be
included in the computation.
(b) When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
time, the court for cause shown may, at any time in its discretion:
(1) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order; or
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period, permit the act to be done if there was a reasonable excuse for the failure to
act; but the court may not extend the time for taking any action under the
rules applying to a judgment of acquittal, new trial, arrest of judgment
and appeal, unless otherwise provided in these rules.
(c) A written motion other than one that may be heard ex parte and notice
of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than five days before the time
specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by rule or order of
the court. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be
served with the motion and opposing affidavits may be served not less than
one day before the hearing unless the court permits them to be served at a
later time.

Rule 3. Service and filing of papers.
(a) All written motions, notices and pleadings shall be filed with the court
and served on all other parties.
(b) Whenever service is required or permitted to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney,
unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the
attorney or upon a party shall be made in the manner provided in civil actions.
(c) The party preparing an order shall, upon execution by the court, mail to
each party a copy thereof and certify to the court such mailing.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Service on attorney.
Notice served upon a party's attorney of

record is sufficient. State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d
987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses.
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense
has been committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the
defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by
common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the
offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. An information
may contain or be accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to make out
probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things
as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities,
written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by
any name or description by which they are generally known or by which they
may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning
such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters of judicial notice need be stated.

341

U

(c) The court may i
ment or information
(d) The court may
any time before verdi
substantial rights oft
ment or information
particularity as to bai
same set of facts.
(e) When facts not
inform a defendant o:
enable him to prepare
a bill of particulars. r.
days thereafter, or at i
on its own motion, dir
may be amended or s
justice may require. T
be limited to a statem
tial elements of the ]
(f) An indictment c
name contained there
(g) It shall not be
contained in the stati
(h) Words and phra
meaning unless they i
meaning.
(i) Use of the disjun
the indictment or infc
(j) The names of wit:
was based shall be end
not affect the validity I
cation of the defendam
upon a showing of goo
poses to call whose m
(k) If the defendant
appear before the mag
Proceedings against a
person.
Cross-References. — Ac
copy of accusation, Utah Con
Circuit
courts, crimin
§ 78-4-5.
Criminal Code definition
§ 76-2-201.
Criminal Code not str
§ 76-1-106.
Criminal responsibility
§ 76-2-204.
Criminal responsibility of p
in name of corporation, § 7(
Double jeopardy, Utah Com
§§ 76-1-401 to 76-1-405, 77General definitions for
§ 76-1-601.
"Indictment" defined, § 77

ANALY8I8

Bill of particulars.
—In general.
—Contents.
—Discretion of court.
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Rule 4

(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictriht or information.
id) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at
py time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the
febstantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be amended so as to state the offense with such
Kkicularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the
ame set of facts.
t(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to
inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to
Enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for
a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten
^Jays thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may,
on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars
may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as
justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall
be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the essential elements of the particular offense charged.
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any
name contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated.
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso
contained in the statute creating or defining the offense.
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual
meaning unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal
meaning.
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate
the indictment or information.
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information
was based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall
not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except
upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed.
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to
appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel.
Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural
person.
Cross-References. — Accused entitled to
copy of accusation, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12.
Circuit courts, criminal jurisdiction,
§ 78-4-5.
Criminal Code definition of "corporation,"
§ 76-2-201.
Criminal Code not strictly construed,
§ 76-1-106.
Criminal responsibility of corporation,
§ 76-2-204.
Criminal responsibility of person for conduct
in name of corporation, § 76-2-205.
Double jeopardy, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12;
§§ 76-1-401 to 76-1-405, 77-1-6.
General definitions for Criminal Code,
§ 76-1-601.
"Indictment" defined, § 77-1-3.

"Information" defined, § 77-1-3.
Jurisdiction of military court, § 39-6-16.
Judicial notice, Rules of Evidence, Rule 201.
Justice courts, criminal jurisdiction,
§ 78-5-104 et seq.
Juveniles, jurisdiction, transfer, §§ 78-3a-16
to 78-3a-19. *
Nonmaterial errors and mistakes, Rule 30.
Preliminary examination, Rule 7.
Proof of corporate existence, § 77-17-5.
Prosecution by indictment or information after examination and commitment or waiver
thereof, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 13.
Removal of officers, Utah Const., Art. VI,
Sec. 21; § 77-6-1 et seq.
Statutory construction and definitions in
general, §§ 68-3-11, 68-3-12.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Bill of particulars.
—In general.
—Contents.
—Discretion of court.

—Effect on evidence at trial.
—Failure to provide.
—Failure to request.
—Following amendment of information.
—Not required.

EXHIBIT A

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LONI F. DELAND,

RULING

^i&-;

Plaintiff,

AUG 07

vs.
UINTAH COUNTY,

Case No.:

960800088

-0*. C(.£RK
-DEPUty

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the
issue of liability and damages and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
issue of liability. The Court heard oral argument July 30, 1996 and took the matter under
advisement. The Court has carefully read the Memoranda in support of both Motions with
the accompanying exhibits.
The essential facts necessary to decide this case are not in dispute. Those facts are
set forth in separate paragraph numbers in Plaintiff's Memorandum and will not be
reincorporated in this Ruling. It should be noted that the parties have essentially agreed as to
those facts except for the reasonableness or the amount of the fees and the fact the
representatives of Uintah County had previously acknowledged that compensation would be
appropriate.
Reference is made to Plaintiffs Memorandum and the statements of facts contained
therein.
The Court is faced with the construction of Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30a-2.
That statute provides in relevant part:
"
If an Information is filed against an officer or employee, in
connection with or arising out of any act or omission of that officer
or employee during the performance of his duties, within the scope
of his employment or under color of his authority, and
that
Information is quashed or dismissed or results in a Judgment of
Acquittal, (unless dismissed by the prosecutor),
that officer
or employee shall be entitled to recover from the public entity reasonable
attorney fees and court costs necessarily incurred in the defense of that
Information."
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The Defendant urges a strict construction of the statute and argues that reimbursement
should not be allowed because the Information was not dismissed nor did it result in acquittal.
The Plaintiff argues that to construe the statute narrowly would result in a complete
nullity of the intent of the Legislature and would make the statute meaningless.
It should further be noted that the interpretation of the statute is of first impression. It
should be noted in Salmon vs. Davis County. 289 Utah Advanced Reports 3 (Utah 1996), that
the issue of liability under the statute was not before the Court.
This Court is of the opinion that the Legislative intent here is to partially encourage
qualified persons to run for political office without having to have them be exposed to
tremendous legal fees to defend ill founded actions including criminal actions. The statutory
scheme provides for prior notice for the defense of civil claims and the statute in question here
provides for reimbursement of legal fees in criminal prosecutions.
It would seem to this Court that prior notice would not be necessary under the statutory
format and scheme of things where a defense attorney was retained privately to defend a
criminal matter. The Court is further of the opinion that the intended legislative purpose here
was to provide for defense costs for persons holding public office that are charged with crimes
as a result of being in that office which are either dismissed as a matter of law or where there
is a complete judgment of acquittal.
In the present case, much is said about the three felony charges being dismissed by the
Court, but there only remained the three misdemeanor charges. It would seem to this Court that
when Judge Hyde dismissed the felony charges, it was a result of his interpretation of the exact
felony that was charged as it involved the activities of Sheriff Meacham. In this case, Sheriff
Meacham did some things which were not completely dismissed and the case was not tried to
a verdict.
This Court is of the opinion that the statute should be construed narrowly and that its
legislative purpose and intent would be to fully compensate a person who held public office from
having to defend criminal charges brought as a result of his holding that office where the charges
were found to be unfounded and either dismissed or where the defendant obtained a full
acquittal.
Because there was not a complete exoneration of Sheriff Meacham in this case, this Court
can not allow attorney fees for defense which did not result in a total but only a partial acquittal.
The Court's interpretation of Section 63-30a-2 is consistent with Salmon vs. Davis
County. In Salmon, a Deputy Sheriff was found not guilty by two separate juries and separate
trials on charges of assault that arose out of actions by Salmon. Justice Zimmerman's comment
in the case is worthy of note:
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". . . . The purpose of Section 63-30a-2, which is to indemnify a vindicated
employee. (Regarding the right to defense fees)."

This Court acknowledges that to interpret the statute thus narrowly will discourage
plea agreements involving public officials, but at least part of the factor in the plea
arrangement, if any is made, will be whether or not defense fees will be reimbursed.
For the above and foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss on the issue of liability. The Court will not address the other issues remaining in
the case are they were and are rendered moot by the decision herein.
DATED this ^ ^

day of August, 1996.
BY THE COURft/?

'HN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the Ht^day of August, 1996, true and correct copies of
the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. Herschel Bullen,
Attorney for Plaintiff, at 39 Exchange Place, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 and to
Ms. JoAnn B. Stringham, Uintah County Attorney, at 152 East 100 North, Vernal, UT
84078.
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IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH

LONI DELAND,
RULING
Plaintiff,
Case No. 960800088 CV

vs.
UINTAH COUNTY,

Judge John R. Anderson
Defendant.

The Plaintiff has filed a Motion for New Trial, pursuant to Rule 59 (a)(7) Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. The Court has considered the Supplemental Memorandum, prepared and
filed by the Plaintiff as part of and consideration for the Court's review of it's prior Order.
The Court has carefully reviewed the Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum and the
Response of the Defendant.
The Ruling of the Court will remain the same. That is, the Court will interpret the
statute narrowly. In order to award counsel fee's under the statute will require that all
charges be dismissed or result in a complete acquittal.

DATED this

/ 7

day of September, 1996

District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the / / day of September, 1996, a true and correct copy
of the above Ruling was mailed postage prepaid or hand delivered to Mr. Herschel Bullen,
Attorney for the Plaintiff, 39 Exchange Place, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and to
Ms. JoAnn B. Stringham, Uintah County Attorney, 152 West 100 North, Vernal, Utah
84078.

Deputy Court Clerk

